Life In 19x19

tapir wrote:Talking of value, equal or not, presupposes that human beings are commodities (and thus exchangable). The question offered basically was: Are human beings commodities? Yes or yes?

I think this is not right. There is a tradition of talking about human worth in much the same way you talk about human dignity. It doesn't seem to have any particular connection to commodities.

daniel_the_smith wrote:Anyone who argues with the universe about the way it works will lose. The universe doesn't care how clever you or your argument is, it's still allowed to kill you.

- I like the word 'allow' here. Nature uses its own laws and the computers we use work on logic. We're not allowed to break those laws. In computer world bugs are found by doing something you're not supposed to do. It's easy to code a feature, but great care has to be taken so that it won't be abused.

The word 'allow' can't be used in social situations. With such vast freedom of expression, how can there be timid people? Do they have mental checklist of things they ought not do?

Toge wrote:Many years ago when I was attending class of ethical philosophy, our textbook had a question for us students: "Are human beings equal in value?"

Question is unclear. The term "value" should be defined. For whom/what is a person supposed to be "valuable"?

Two possible interpretations of the question:
1- "Take arbitrary two person's whose lives are in danger and you may save only one. Does it matter which one you choose to save?"
2- "Should everyone's opinion have the equal importance on giving decisions relevant to public?"

These two interpretations are fundamentally different and would lead to two virtually unrelated discussions. I think it is worth clarifying the question before making the discussion.

Toge wrote:So here's the radical idea I had. Is there such thing as 'ought'? How can you tell the universe that its laws 'should' work in some other way. How could humans be unbound of nature;

Trying to beat nature is called civilization. Why is average human life longer than that of 1000 years ago?

It's not a particularly radical idea and anyone who doesn't subscribe to it fails miserably at logic. You can't derive an "ought" from an "is" and all "value" is subjective.

Philosophy is the worst. There are so many ridiculous ideas and isms that have no intellectual merit. The vast majority of famous philosophers have been absolute retards. Ethical philosopthy is the worst of the worst.

EDIT: A lot of people try to get around the ought-is problem by deriving oughts by presuming specified desired ends and saying the agent ought do whatever achieves said ends. This is a hypothetical imperative and completely sidesteps the actual debate. The problem with oughts is that you can't derive desired ends.

Toge wrote:Is there such thing as 'ought'?

Yes, as it's a word with a definition.

Toge wrote:How can you tell the universe that its laws 'should' work in some other way. How could humans be unbound of nature; how could we tell them what they should be and what they should do? Wouldn't it be much more practical to observe actions and their effects?

We just tell them. They have the right not to follow them, and they have the right to tell us we 'ought' to work/do things in some other way too.

This sounds distinctly liking seeking an absolute truth to me?

Toge wrote:I've noticed that people who often assume things tend to be angry. I've noticed it in myself too in situations where I've had expectations. I guess trying to uphold mistaken beliefs like that is frustrating. The crux of the problem is not whether these expectations are true or false, but having them in the first place. It's a mental handicap that prevents experiencing the world.

I agree, perhaps that's why I tend to be kinda laid back

topazg wrote:

Toge wrote:Is there such thing as 'ought'?

Yes, as it's a word with a definition.

I think Toge knows it's a word. The question is if it has a referent in reality, i.e., is it like a rainbow or like a gnome? ("gnome" is a word with a definition, but no referent)

My own answer is yes, "oughts" have referents; they are facts about the values of humans.

KGO wrote:It's not a particularly radical idea and anyone who doesn't subscribe to it fails miserably at logic. You can't derive an "ought" from an "is" and all "value" is subjective.

Ok, so when it comes to oughts, we can't formulate an argument which runs as follows:

If X, then Y. Where X is some given fact, and Y is an 'ought.'

EDIT: A lot of people try to get around the ought-is problem by deriving oughts by presuming specified desired ends and saying the agent ought do whatever achieves said ends. This is a hypothetical imperative and completely sidesteps the actual debate.

Ok, so the hypothetical imperative sidesteps the issue of whether or not you can derive an 'ought' from an 'is.' That means, it won't take the form above. Well, what is the form of a hypothetical imperative?

If I have desired end X, then I should employ means Y (where Y is the best known means for achieving end X).

Oh look, this fits exactly the form of what you are denying is possible. Yet here, you seem to not only be conceding that hypothetical imperatives exist, but claim that they sidestep the issue! What would that issue be?

The problem with oughts is that you can't derive desired ends.

Ok, well this seems much less immediately sympathetic than your point about being unable to derive an 'ought' from an 'is,' which at least has a longstanding tradition of skeptical argument and denial you can appeal to. So now what you've left is just a bald assertion that you can't derive desired ends. Perhaps you'd like to substantiate that claim.

This certainly seems plainly false to me. Even in the hypothetical imperative case we are deriving desired ends! For instance:

I desire to get warm, so given the resources available to me I should go out and chop some wood etc...

Well, now my chopping wood is an end to me, and can be treated with the same rules, given that I want to chop wood I should go and get an axe, etc...

Perhaps what you meant was that you can't derive desired ends without reference to some pre-existing desired end. Maybe you are right about this, but suppose there are certain ends which it is inconsistent to pursue simply on account of their incompatibility with the imperative to fulfill desire in general. It seems we are beginning to have the scaffolding necessary to produce generalized 'oughts' which are applicable, at the least, for most people most of the time.

KGO wrote:The vast majority of famous philosophers have been absolute retards.

This reminds me of 4 kyu kibitzing games who say things like "omg such a weak 8d".

jts wrote:

KGO wrote:The vast majority of famous philosophers have been absolute retards.

This reminds me of 4 kyu kibitzing games who say things like "omg such a weak 8d".

I wouldn't have said it that way, but I have some sympathy for KGO's position. Historically, when a particular group of philosophers figure out what they're talking about they form an actual science (e.g., astronomy, biology, math, physics, etc) and cease being philosophers. Over time, that tends to leave people who can't figure out what they're talking about in the field of philosophy. Or, another way to say the same thing is that philosophy is the study of things we don't actually understand well enough to study...

ETA: Historically, many/most philosophers probably were ahead of their time, probably significantly ahead-- but if we compare them to the knowledge we have today, they may fall short. But that's not a fair comparison.

Monadology wrote:Ok, so the hypothetical imperative sidesteps the issue of whether or not you can derive an 'ought' from an 'is.' That means, it won't take the form above. Well, what is the form of a hypothetical imperative?

If I have desired end X, then I should employ means Y (where Y is the best known means for achieving end X).

Oh look, this fits exactly the form of what you are denying is possible. Yet here, you seem to not only be conceding that hypothetical imperatives exist, but claim that they sidestep the issue! What would that issue be?

The problem with oughts is that you can't derive desired ends.

Ok, well this seems much less immediately sympathetic than your point about being unable to derive an 'ought' from an 'is,' which at least has a longstanding tradition of skeptical argument and denial you can appeal to. So now what you've left is just a bald assertion that you can't derive desired ends. Perhaps you'd like to substantiate that claim.

This certainly seems plainly false to me. Even in the hypothetical imperative case we are deriving desired ends! For instance:

I desire to get warm, so given the resources available to me I should go out and chop some wood etc...

Well, now my chopping wood is an end to me, and can be treated with the same rules, given that I want to chop wood I should go and get an axe, etc...

Perhaps what you meant was that you can't derive desired ends without reference to some pre-existing desired end. Maybe you are right about this, but suppose there are certain ends which it is inconsistent to pursue simply on account of their incompatibility with the imperative to fulfill desire in general. It seems we are beginning to have the scaffolding necessary to produce generalized 'oughts' which are applicable, at the least, for most people most of the time.

Even if you're thirsty or cold you can't say that you "ought" to drink or warm yourself because that would be assuming that you ought to satisfy your desires. Since you can't derive that you ought follow your desires from any "is", you can't say that you "ought" or "should" drink if you're thirsty or warm yourself if you're cold. All you can say is that if you want to satify X desire, you must do Y. That is a hypothetical imperative and not an "ought".

Oughts are categorical imperatives and that is what the is-ought problem points out.

When Toge asks if there is such a thing as "ought", then he's obviously not asking if there exists imperatives that are conditional. That would just be silly.

EDIT: Note that by "desired ends", I did not mean ends that the agent desires. Perhaps that caused some confusion. I lack an actual term for it, but I mean ends that "ought" to happen. Of course, here we see another ought, which is why you can't derive an ought from an is because you can only say what you ought to do if you know what ought to happen and what ought to happen is not an "is". Ergo, there are no oughts.

jts wrote:

KGO wrote:The vast majority of famous philosophers have been absolute retards.

This reminds me of 4 kyu kibitzing games who say things like "omg such a weak 8d".

Except famous philosophers didn't become famous because of some competetive ranking system. They became famous because of the popularity of their ideas, and if there's one thing history has thaught us, it's that the popularity of ideas are rarely correlated with intellectual quality.

KGO wrote:

jts wrote:

KGO wrote:The vast majority of famous philosophers have been absolute retards.

This reminds me of 4 kyu kibitzing games who say things like "omg such a weak 8d".

Except famous philosophers didn't become famous because of some competetive ranking system. They became famous because of the popularity of their ideas, and if there's one thing history has thaught us, it's that the popularity of ideas are rarely correlated with intellectual quality.

Okay, but we're not talking about airport bestsellers here. If you could churn out material of a higher intellectual quality than Plato, Kant, or Wittgenstein, then people would pay attention to you and you would be hot detritus. If you can't, you should take the rhetoric down a notch.

jts wrote:
Okay, but we're not talking about airport bestsellers here. If you could churn out material of a higher intellectual quality than Plato, Kant, or Wittgenstein, then people would pay attention to you and you would be hot detritus. If you can't, you should take the rhetoric down a notch.

You should judge what I say on the basis of its merit.

Also: The intellectual quality of Kant's work was rather low.

KGO wrote:

jts wrote:
Okay, but we're not talking about airport bestsellers here. If you could churn out material of a higher intellectual quality than Plato, Kant, or Wittgenstein, then people would pay attention to you and you would be hot detritus. If you can't, you should take the rhetoric down a notch.

You should judge what I say on the basis of its merit.

Also: The intellectual quality of Kant's work was rather low.

Oh, trust me. I'm judging what you say.

KGO wrote:Even if you're thirsty or cold you can't say that you "ought" to drink or warm yourself because that would be assuming that you ought to satisfy your desires. Since you can't derive that you ought follow your desires from any "is", you can't say that you "ought" or "should" drink if you're thirsty or warm yourself if you're cold. All you can say is that if you want to satify X desire, you must do Y. That is a hypothetical imperative and not an "ought".

Oughts are categorical imperatives and that is what the is-ought problem points out.

When Toge asks if there is such a thing as "ought", then he's obviously not asking if there exists imperatives that are conditional. That would just be silly.

But here's where you're confusing me. If Toge is asking about unconditional imperatives, then they clearly can't be derived from facts, otherwise they would be conditional on those facts.

Even a categorical imperative is not unconditional. The categorical imperative is contingent on the existence of beings which form maxims.

Note: I'm discussing this in Kantian terms because that's how you seem to be deploying the concepts of hypothetical/categorical imperative.

EDIT: Note that by "desired ends", I did not mean ends that the agent desires. Perhaps that caused some confusion. I lack an actual term for it, but I mean ends that "ought" to happen.

Ok, but I gave an example of an end that "ought" to happen. What's tricky here is that you are only taking as "ought" some kind of strict unconditional "ought." But of course such an "ought" couldn't derived from a fact, otherwise it would be conditional on that fact. In this sense, claiming that you can't derive an "ought" from an "is" is pretty trivial.

Of course, here we see another ought, which is why you can't derive an ought from an is because you can only say what you ought to do if you know what ought to happen and what ought to happen is not an "is". Ergo, there are no oughts.

1. You can only say X if you know X.
2. X is not Y.
Therefore: There are no X's.

I don't even need to point out how problematic this argument is. But let's change the conclusion to something not so strong:

1. You can only say X if you know X.
2. X is not Y.
Therefore: You can't derive X from Y.

Even this doesn't follow! I could know X because of Y even if it isn't Y. We make this kind of inference every day! Granted, for these inferences we need a connecting premise, e.g.

1. There is a loud whistling noise outside my door.
2. If there is a loud whistling noise outside my door, that means the tea is ready.
Therefore: The tea is ready.

Now, loud whistling noises are not the readiness of tea! Not at all! Yet somehow we're getting from one thing to another thing when those things aren't identical.

So what it is incumbent on the proponent of 'oughts' is to provide a premise along the lines of the second premise in this argument. It is incumbent on the denier to show why this kind of connecting premise is impossible when it comes to 'is' and 'ought' (presumably by showing that all such premises require a further 'ought' to establish). So far, it's not clear you've done so.

On the other hand, in Kantian morality such a connecting premise is posited: namely, that 'oughts' are a result of the rational intentionality inherent in agency. If you will to perform an end, you are bounded rationally to employ some means to that end. Otherwise there is a strict volitional incoherence in your willing.

daniel_the_smith wrote:I wouldn't have said it that way, but I have some sympathy for KGO's position. Historically, when a particular group of philosophers figure out what they're talking about they form an actual science (e.g., astronomy, biology, math, physics, etc) and cease being philosophers. Over time, that tends to leave people who can't figure out what they're talking about in the field of philosophy. Or, another way to say the same thing is that philosophy is the study of things we don't actually understand well enough to study...

This is actually remarkably close that something I (as someone who was previously aiming for a Ph.D. and academic job in philosophy) have often said. Actually, I stole it from a professor of mine, if you want more authority .

Anyway, you can think of philosophy as studying problems that we don't yet have a settled method for answering. So in a sense, philosophy attracts people who can't figure out what they're talking about.

However, the sciences themselves create lots of questions that scientists don't really know how to answer, and those attract philosophers of science (I often cite philosophy of science, not because it's "philosophy enough", in Quine's phrase, but because it's so easy to see that it is doing important work). Biologists know how to answer many questions, but they don't know how to answer certain abstract questions about what the concept of a species is. Scientists know many things, but a biologist or physicist is probably not in a good position to answer the question of whether biology reduces to physics. Philosophers don't know for sure either, but they have something to offer.

But it's obvious that unless you think human knowledge has reached a plateau where we can make no further progress on the questions that we don't yet know how to answer, some time has to be spent banging our heads against those intractable and confusing questions.

There is one reason this picture is inaccurate: by the time of Newton and Leibniz, physics had clearly figured out how to answer its questions in the relevant sense. There was a lot that Newton didn't know yet, but he was on the right track. And yet his work, like Galileo's and Einstein's, contains a lot of what we would call philosophical arguments, and they don't seem to be window dressing, as if Newton just concatenated two independent books he was working on.