tchan001 wrote:If JF does not reference any other game for the position he chose, why would you think that he had picked a position from a different game?
I didn't. (And, why not?) I try to keep an open mind. I didn't know where the position came from, and I kept it that way until there is clear evidence one way or the other.
tchan001 wrote:Would a different game actually be more useful to see the value of RJ's methods compared with Yi Sedol's positional judgement in a particular moment of Game 4?
Yes, actually, very much so. The more data points, and the more varieties, the better. My understanding is it's less about comparing with the assessment of a particular pro, but rather with a consensus among some pros.
daal wrote:I find it hard to imagine pros agreeing on the second, and certainly not on the third possibility.
Why? (I still haven't looked at Game 4, or the board in this thread, or any of the analyses. Maybe it's very clear to you. )
Ed, this is pure speculation on my part about what I think pros would or wouldn't agree on, and also speculation about John's intention with his post, and I could be utterly wrong on both counts, but it has nothing to do with the game itself, and quite frankly, my speculation is really not the interesting aspect of this thread. The interesting part of this thread is the question whether numerical assessments, particularly Robert's, lead to similar conclusions as the pros. Let's wait and hear what the professional consensus was.
Thank you, Robert. I would assess your evaluation as very creditable - probably as good as the pros', maybe better, and easier to understand. But different.
The game is Game 4 of the Honinbo title match, after the Atom Bomb game. Hashimoto Utaro is White, Iwamoto Kaoru Black. I deliberately chose it as not being special in terms of content, so as to create a fair test, but one thing special about these games was that, as they weren't published at the time, both players simply recorded their thoughts after the game, and so we have direct evaluations from both sides and untrammelled by any philosophising from observers.
Obviously we are still not getting the full SP, but the way the players gave their assessments seems fully in line with the way we see it in more normal commentaries.
First, Iwamoto (perhaps being modest as Black) thought White could be rather pleased with his position when he played the last move (White 62) shown on the left side. He said the "balance of territories has now become equal." Whether or not you agree with this, there are problems with it, which I will come to in a moment. He also thought that whilst Black now seemed obliged to attack the White group on the lower left side (but initially from underneath rather than on top as Robert suggested) in order to reduce the White moyo, he could expect little joy from that. Presumably for that reason he did not attack the lower right group at once, but played a move (Black 63) at the top (Robert's move C = L18). However, he did not call it a reducing move, as Robert did, but focused instead on another aspect, which was turning the White stone in the upper right into a mochikomi stone (ending up with the effect of a wasted invasion). White had played that as a probe but it was premature. If he had deferred it he could have answered Black 63 in different ways. The reducing aspect must have been there, but apparently not uppermost in his mind. This was so important to him that he played the Black 67-White 68 exchange to confirm the capture, even though this strengthened White's moyo. Note that Robert did cover this point by referring to aji intersections, but he appeared to prioritise the moyo over the aji at this juncture.
There are a couple of tactical points to make, too. One is that Black's lower left group was not as secure as it looks, and both players seemed aware of that (one result was that White got more on the left side than Robert bargained for). Another is that White had a wicked move at M8 (White 78) which Iwamoto did not see, and that impacted both on the moyo and the safety of Black's lower right group.
My own impression is that at this stage the pros and Robert coincide well enough, but here (as in many other commentaries) the pros place a lot of emphasis on factors such as mochikomi stones. I sense they give much more weight to these than amateurs ever do, and I speculate that the reason may be that they can assume that in their games virtually every move both sides make is at least satisfactory, and so a rather obvious case of a wasted stone (a connection on a dame point is another example) is enough for them to conclude that the scales have been tipped.
But if that's the case, their method is as useful to us amateurs as a fart in a perfume factory. Most of us buff our nails if we can make a couple of satisfactory moves in a game!
Reverting now to the "balance of territories" problem I mentioned. From wide experience, I don't think this implies a close count of the type Robert makes. I think that at this stage, and much later, they usually rely on heuristics such as mochikomi or virtual territory (look at the area of your moyo and count half for yourself on the principle that the opponent will invade in one half but live with only two points and in the process will allow you to form a solid wall round the other half - there are variations where you count a third).
Further, in this game, there were several subsequent comments that the game was close, though edging in Black's favour. That suggests to me an ongoing refinement in the assessment, simply because more moves have been played, and (as is common elsewhere) these comments nearly always coincide with remarks about things becoming settled, so that the losing side is running out of areas to skirmish in (as well as territory being easier to count, of course). This also suggests to me that the early evaluations are tempered to a very large degree - perhaps much larger than Robert allows? - by the scope for messing around. Some sort of territory count must be in the mix, but may even be the most trivial aspect in many cases.
However, one further complication is that we are told repeatedly that the game is close, but then Black makes a horrible mistake (199) which was worth 10 points, according to its perpetrator Iwamoto. Since Black won anyway by 3, and this move was near the endgame, it seems to suggest Black was actually about 13 points ahead until then - which is nothing like close. Since other examples of this can easily be found, we are faced with various possibilities, including hyperbole ("ten" points means 1 point or OMG!!!!) or a weird definition of "close" (e.g. close by amateur standards). Robert's method avoids this woolliness.
G2 and F2 weakened the lower left black group, so of course White can make a bit more territory on the left side afterwards.
I considered attacking the lower left white group from above or below and saw little difference in the developments, so I simply mentioned an example of an attack.
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