POLL: Cryonics - do you want to be frozen when you die?

[daniel_the_smith]

Human life is what it is because it is finite. We are born, we are young, we progress into adulthood, and we live our lives coping with that finiteness.

It will be very difficult to convince me that death is actually a feature and not a bug.

If death is a feature, then why do people dread it? Why do people cry at funerals? Why do people do inconvenient things (e.g., eat healthy) to try and live longer? Every facet of human nature rebels against death. Death is not our friend.

Please don't take this the wrong way, but I consider sentiments like the one you expressed to be rationalizations or coping mechanisms in the face of hopelessness.

But ours is the first generation that can reasonably conceive of a time when humanity will win. I intend to do everything in my power to live to see that happen.

(For reference, I put the chance of cryonics working at 1-5%. I also put the chance of a positive singularity in my lifetime at 1-5%.)

[Kirby]

I want to stay alive for as long as possible. It seems like I'll miss out on so much otherwise. However, it's very thought-provoking to think about the topic.

I think it's not an uncommon assumption that, after death, people experience "nothingness" (though, there are a variety of religious beliefs, as well).

However, it's interesting to me that, unlike many other things in life which we can learn about via observation and experimentation, there is no data available for what the experience of death will be like. We know, from an external perspective, that people appear to lose consciousness. But where does that consciousness go? Does it go anywhere?

In one sense, it's scary to consider what will happen after death. In another sense, it may be interesting to see what actually happens. Perhaps it will be nothing - you may lose consciousness and have no experience at all.

But we have no data to ascertain that this is actually the case. If there is any way to consciously recognize the experience after death - then it may be interesting to find out what happens.

Although, considering the chance that there will be no conscious recognition of what happens at that point - well, then, I want to stay alive so that I can keep consciously recognizing the present.

I like my consciousness!

[topazg]

If death is a feature, then why do people dread it? Why do people cry at funerals? Why do people do inconvenient things (e.g., eat healthy) to try and live longer? Every facet of human nature rebels against death. Death is not our friend.

I don't personally dread it, and some cultures see it as a positive journey through to the next place, and neither dread it nor cry when it happens to other people. Rebelling against death is a cultural thing, it isn't universal. Personally, I tend not to feel sad when family members die these days - not because I'm happy that they are dead, but because it just happens and that's a part of daily life. I choose to remember the contributions people that die have made to me and those around them, and I hope I do enough with mine that other people will have things worthwhile to remember me for. Passing on that baton doesn't worry me at all though.

I suspect I have spent too much time enjoying zen philosophy to contribute meaningfully to this discussion, but I'm certainly a happier person on a day to day basis than I used to be, and my attitude to death has probably stemmed from that sort of thing.

I eat healthy and exercise because I want to be able to fill the years I do have enjoying them and doing fun things. It's not particularly inconvenient any more than working is, which serves very much the same purpose. I don't think that Death is our friend, but nor is it our enemy, it just "is". Likewise, I don't see it as either a bug or a feature.

If we lived forever, I don't believe we would be able to sustain life materially, economically, or ecologically, nor manage sufficiently on a completely overpopulated planet. I suspect quality of life would drop considerably if no-one died.

Please don't take this the wrong way, but I consider sentiments like the one you expressed to be rationalizations or coping mechanisms in the face of hopelessness.

You imply there is something that has to be coped with, or that the very nature of it is hopeless

[crux]

I'm not certain that anyone will have any work to do in a post-singularity future, which is really the only kind of future I can imagine the frozen waking up to.

Ok, now we have added sentient machines to the cryonics. We'll also need interstellar travel and the ability to terraform planets since human beings are unlikely to want to stop procreating entirely. All this may be good science fiction, but it doesn't seem all that likely to be a realistic outcome.

Even if it does happen, and the machines are doing all the work - what will you do with all your time? Won't things get a little repetitive and boring after the first couple hundred years or so? Think about poor Wowbagger the Infinitely Prolonged.

[jts]

Just a few scattered thoughts (mostly responding to daniel_the_smith...)

There are lots of psychological theories about why people cry when others die. Obviously there are lots of feelings of powerlessness, deprivation, and guilt floating around. But that doesn't mean that we never want anyone to die. Quite to the contrary, a great deal of grief might be a nervous reaction to thinking that the time had come for someone to die.

I never like to do the dishes. I would always rather do the dishes in an hour rather than right now. So logically, what I would like most of all is to have all of my dishes be dirty all the time.

All it takes is a passing acquaintance with the history of Christian ideology to learn that we are very far from the first generation to hope to triumph over death.

There are many objective features which mark human life. Aging, senescence and death; the drive to reproduce; the erection and preservation of status hierarchies; and many others besides which would be boring to list. Every human being has to wear these features, but to some they are a cloak that can be worn lightly and cast away freely, while to others they are a steel-hard casing. Everyone dies, but only a few people stay up at night worrying about dying.

What would have to be true to convince you that the person revived by cryogenics was you, and not a wholly new person? What percentage of their memories would have to be the same? What percentage of their personality? What percentage of their body? Does the new you have to have the same friends, relatives, lovers, hobbies? The same sensory perceptions? --- And what would convince you that a person kept alive for hundreds of years with exotic medical technology was you, and not a wholly new person? What would convince you that a human being born at a different time from you was a wholly new person, and not you?

[hyperpape]

What would have to be true to convince you that the person revived by cryogenics was you, and not a wholly new person? What percentage of their memories would have to be the same? What percentage of their personality? What percentage of their body? Does the new you have to have the same friends, relatives, lovers, hobbies? The same sensory perceptions? --- And what would convince you that a person kept alive for hundreds of years with exotic medical technology was you, and not a wholly new person? What would convince you that a human being born at a different time from you was a wholly new person, and not you?

It would take a really good philosophical argument.

(Still mulling over my own response to daniel_the_smith)

[daniel_the_smith]

Please don't take this the wrong way, but I consider sentiments like the one you expressed to be rationalizations or coping mechanisms in the face of hopelessness.

You imply there is something that has to be coped with, or that the very nature of it is hopeless

Actually, I'll directly state that, and add that Zen is clearly an excellent coping mechanism.

If we lived forever, I don't believe we would be able to sustain life materially, economically, or ecologically, nor manage sufficiently on a completely overpopulated planet. I suspect quality of life would drop considerably if no-one died.

This is a failure of imagination; a future in which we can effectively raise the dead will be very unlikely to have those problems. See below.

Ok, now we have added sentient machines to the cryonics. We'll also need interstellar travel and the ability to terraform planets since human beings are unlikely to want to stop procreating entirely. All this may be good science fiction, but it doesn't seem all that likely to be a realistic outcome.

Humanity will either (eventually) achieve all of the above or go extinct. I don't think there are other options. Unfortunately I consider the latter to be somewhat more probable at the moment.

Even if it does happen, and the machines are doing all the work - what will you do with all your time? Won't things get a little repetitive and boring after the first couple hundred years or so? Think about poor Wowbagger the Infinitely Prolonged.

Short answer-- there are very few possible futures so boring you want to die in which you can't actually off yourself. And I'd like to see the future for myself before calling it one way or the other.

(Very) long answer: http://lesswrong.com/lw/xy/the_fun_theory_sequence/

Response to jts later. I have things to do!

[topazg]

Please don't take this the wrong way, but I consider sentiments like the one you expressed to be rationalizations or coping mechanisms in the face of hopelessness.

You imply there is something that has to be coped with, or that the very nature of it is hopeless

Actually, I'll directly state that, and add that Zen is clearly an excellent coping mechanism.

Hahaha, touche, it does still start from an implication that I feel there's something needed to be coped with. Are you not open to the possibility that there are two sides to this particular coin?

[Tryphon]

I'm currently reading Axiomatic by Greg Egan, which is a really good SF novels book, and deals with some of ideas expressed here. Just an advertising for a great book.

[Joaz Banbeck]

...
What would have to be true to convince you that the person revived by cryogenics was you, and not a wholly new person? What percentage of their memories would have to be the same? What percentage of their personality? What percentage of their body? Does the new you have to have the same friends, relatives, lovers, hobbies? The same sensory perceptions? --- And what would convince you that a person kept alive for hundreds of years with exotic medical technology was you, and not a wholly new person? What would convince you that a human being born at a different time from you was a wholly new person, and not you?

If I remember being me, I am me. Memory = identity.

Other people come and - unfortunately - go. Hobbies come and go, Body parts come and go ( I lose hair, add wrinkles. ) Yet these do not define who I am. They are merely the circumstances around me.

If you make the changes a bit more radical, I'm still me. I might not know a single person in 2850, but I'm still me. I might have chromium hip joints ( as some already do ) or I might have a chomium skeleton. I'm still me.

If I remember being me, I am me.

[Redundant]

...
What would have to be true to convince you that the person revived by cryogenics was you, and not a wholly new person? What percentage of their memories would have to be the same? What percentage of their personality? What percentage of their body? Does the new you have to have the same friends, relatives, lovers, hobbies? The same sensory perceptions? --- And what would convince you that a person kept alive for hundreds of years with exotic medical technology was you, and not a wholly new person? What would convince you that a human being born at a different time from you was a wholly new person, and not you?

If I remember being me, I am me. Memory = identity.

Other people come and - unfortunately - go. Hobbies come and go, Body parts come and go ( I lose hair, add wrinkles. ) Yet these do not define who I am. They are merely the circumstances around me.

If you make the changes a bit more radical, I'm still me. I might not know a single person in 2850, but I'm still me. I might have chromium hip joints ( as some already do ) or I might have a chomium skeleton. I'm still me.

If I remember being me, I am me.

What's even more fun is when one considers the possibility of uploading human consciousness to other computing substrates. Then we can run into the "problem" of having multiple instances of the same person running independently and diverging.

[hyperpape]

If I remember being me, I am me. Memory = identity

True*, but not helpful. If I'm not me, I can't remember being me. It's a circular definition.

Our futuristic brain surgeons (the same ones who raise us from the dead) might be able to plant my memories in ten heads. They could plant memories of being me in someone who was nothing like me (an aggressive womanizing criminal for instance). That person would not be me.

The penultimate time I TA'd a course, the professor did an entire section on personal identity. I could probably find the readings.

*Major consequence: someone with Alzheimer's is not who they were. That might be a counterexample.

[daniel_the_smith]

There are lots of psychological theories about why people cry when others die. Obviously there are lots of feelings of powerlessness, deprivation, and guilt floating around. But that doesn't mean that we never want anyone to die. Quite to the contrary, a great deal of grief might be a nervous reaction to thinking that the time had come for someone to die.

"the time had come for someone to die"-- Barring tragedy, aging, illness, etc., (all likely to be nonexistent or very rare in a future capable of waking the frozen), I can't think of any reason why such a time should come for anyone.

I never like to do the dishes. I would always rather do the dishes in an hour rather than right now. So logically, what I would like most of all is to have all of my dishes be dirty all the time.

I don't think that follows at all. When your desire to not appear to be a slob overcomes your laziness, you'll do the dishes.

All it takes is a passing acquaintance with the history of Christian ideology to learn that we are very far from the first generation to hope to triumph over death.

Trying not to make this a religious conversation:

Which is why I had the word "reasonable" in there.

What would have to be true to convince you that the person revived by cryogenics was you, and not a wholly new person?

Honestly, I think this is the first non-trivial objection, in that there are several logical steps needed.

1. Consciousness (personality, memories, etc) is entirely produced/stored in the brain (mainly and most importantly in the neural connections).
2. Disruptions to the brain smaller than those of thermal noise do not harm this information.
3. Cryogenic freezing preserves the neural connections.

I give #1 and #2 both a > 99% chance of being correct. #3 I'll give > 90% chance*.

I can expand if desired. Basically, if you agree that the "you" of today is the same as the "you" that went to bed last night, this objection goes away-- a well done cryogenic revival should cause on the order of that much change to your brain*. (If you think those "you"'s are different, well, then you're already used to being different people anyway and it shouldn't bother you!)

[*] No comment on the death process, which may be more or less hard on your brain depending on how exactly it happens. Though I will say that it appears that in oxygen deprived brain damage, most of the brain damage occurs when oxygen is restored to the brain, not when it is first withheld.

What percentage of their memories would have to be the same? What percentage of their personality? What percentage of their body?

Memories and personality go along with the brain. The rest of the body is less important; in theory it (or a close enough substitute) could be created given my DNA.

BTW, I don't think being "me" is a binary distinction. A being sharing 90% of my brain layout I would consider 90% me, and I expect cryonics to do significantly better than that if it works at all. All humans share the same general layout, but it's the exact specifics that make the difference.

Does the new you have to have the same friends, relatives, lovers, hobbies?

I'm not sure this makes sense. If you lose/gain a friend, does that make you a different person? I would say: not in the way I think we're talking about.

The same sensory perceptions?

I'm not sure what you mean by this.

what would convince you that a person kept alive for hundreds of years with exotic medical technology was you, and not a wholly new person?

Shared history with my current brain. Note that there's no need to add in the medical technology to get this paradox! I'm very different than I was 10 years ago, and I consider the differences improvements (growth). I imagine the me of 100 years from now will be quite different from the current me, and will consider those differences the same way. As long as you can draw a line through time and space connecting the informational content of our brains*, we will be the "same" person.

[*] So, (accurate) digital representations running under emulation would still be "me".

What would convince you that a human being born at a different time from you was a wholly new person, and not you?

Lack of shared history with my current brain. Time and distance are effectively the same thing for this question: how do you know you're not Britney Spears?

[Kirby]

Just for the record, and to avoid any mistakes, I want to firmly state that the very nature of anything indeed is emptiness and an eternal chasing after wind...

This is possibly true. But no living person has data of what happens after death. So the presumed emptiness is, perhaps, simply a null hypothesis.

Without a single data point on the matter, it is somewhat of a difficult thought to analyze scientifically.

[Redundant]

For some interesting novels on this sort of stuff (transhumanism and the singularity), I recommend the following novels available for free online.

Accelerando

Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom.