Monadology wrote:But here's where you're confusing me. If Toge is asking about unconditional imperatives, then they clearly can't be derived from facts, otherwise they would be conditional on those facts.
That's exactly right, and that is what the is-ought problem points out. Categorical imperatives are by definition not derived from facts.
Even a categorical imperative is not unconditional. The categorical imperative is contingent on the existence of beings which form maxims.
Then it is not a categorical imperative, which makes sense, since categorical imperatives do not exist.
Ok, but I gave an example of an end that "ought" to happen. What's tricky here is that you are only taking as "ought" some kind of strict unconditional "ought." But of course such an "ought" couldn't derived from a fact, otherwise it would be conditional on that fact. In this sense, claiming that you can't derive an "ought" from an "is" is pretty trivial.
Exactly right once again. It's not really even a claim. It is just pointing it out. Kant's categorical imperative is false because the "ought" does not follow from his conditions.
1. You can only say X if you know X.
2. X is not Y.
Therefore: There are no X's.
Correct. You cannot derive from anything, except from an "is", so that makes perfect sense. "Ought" (X) cannot be derived without knowing "ought" (X), which is not an "is" (Y) and therefore, does not exist. Commonly refered to the is-ought problem.
I don't even need to point out how problematic this argument is. But let's change the conclusion to something not so strong:
1. You can only say X if you know X.
2. X is not Y.
Therefore: You can't derive X from Y.
Even this doesn't follow! I could know X because of Y even if it isn't Y. We make this kind of inference every day! Granted, for these inferences we need a connecting premise, e.g.
No, you cannot derive X from Y because you cannot derive X without knowing X. You ignored the first step. Of course, it's nonsensical because "ought" is a nonsensical concept in the first place.
1. There is a loud whistling noise outside my door.
2. If there is a loud whistling noise outside my door, that means the tea is ready.
Therefore: The tea is ready.
Now, loud whistling noises are not the readiness of tea! Not at all! Yet somehow we're getting from one thing to another thing when those things aren't identical.
The readiness of the tea is an "is". "Ought" is not an "is". The whistling noise implies that the tea is ready. Nothing implies what you "ought" to do because you don't know what the conditions are: You don't know why the "is" you're trying to derive from matters. And keep in mind, I'm not saying you just can't know them. I'm saying they don't exist because "ought" cannot be derived from "is" and therefore does not exist.
So what it is incumbent on the proponent of 'oughts' is to provide a premise along the lines of the second premise in this argument. It is incumbent on the denier to show why this kind of connecting premise is impossible when it comes to 'is' and 'ought' (presumably by showing that all such premises require a further 'ought' to establish). So far, it's not clear you've done so.
I have.
On the other hand, in Kantian morality such a connecting premise is posited: namely, that 'oughts' are a result of the rational intentionality inherent in agency. If you will to perform an end, you are bounded rationally to employ some means to that end. Otherwise there is a strict volitional incoherence in your willing.
Just another hypothetical imperative where "must" has been exchanged for "ought". It's not a categorical imperative. There is no reason why the rational intentionality inherent in agency "ought" to matter. It does not imply that you "ought" to do something any more than any other "is". It is not a categorical imperative. It is not an "ought".
You can define "ought" however you will, I guess, but you've lost the argument about whether you can derive categorical imperatives from an "is" and it completely trivializes Kant's work (although it was terrible to begin with). I can define "ought" as the result of my mom's opinions and go around saying I ought to do whatever my mom says, but it does not make me a great philosopher. I can define "ought" as the result of god's word, but it would make me a humongous fucktard.
Or, another way to say the same thing is that philosophy is the study of things we don't actually understand well enough to study...